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During the 1930s and 1940s economic crisis and world war in Canada worked
to erode the persistent ideological claim that government best played a largely
hands-off role in social and economic life. For Howard P. Robinson
(1874–1950), a Saint John, New Brunswick, newspaper owner and capitalist,
this trend was part of a broader challenge to what he believed was the British
tradition in Canada. Subscribing to a sense of Britishness that was both racial-
ist and imperialist, he believed the strict maintenance of social order and
laissez-faire philosophy to be key aspects of the British tradition. Increasingly,
however, the rising tide of social democracy and economic and cultural inte-
gration with the United States made Robinson’s worldview anachronistic within
the outlook of the Canadian bourgeoisie. Robinson’s position was not without
its contradictions, but his enduring sense of Britishness provides an archetypal
case study of the mentalité of a conservative member of Canada’s economic
élite during a time of significant changes. 
Résumé
Au cours des années 1930 et 1940, la crise économique et la guerre mondiale
ont contribué à saper le raisonnement idéologique persistant au Canada
voulant que le gouvernement devait jouer un rôle non interventionniste dans les
sphères sociale et économique.  Pour Howard P. Robinson (1874–1950), pro-
priétaire de journal et capitaliste de Saint-Jean (N.-B.), cette tendance
s’inscrivait dans le cadre d’une remise en cause plus vaste de ce qu’il considé -
rait comme l’héritage britannique au Canada. Partisan de l’idée de la 
« bri tanni cité » définie en termes racialistes et impérialistes, il croyait au main-
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tien rigoureux de l’ordre social et à la philosophie du laissez-faire comme
aspects clés de la tradition britannique.  De plus en plus, cependant, la montée
de la social-démocratie et l’intégration économique et culturelle avec les États-
Unis ont rendu anachronique la vision du monde de Robinson au sein des vues
de la bourgeoisie canadienne.  La position de Robinson n’était pas sans con-
tradictions, mais sa notion durable de « britannicité » autorise une d’étude de
cas archétypale sur la mentalité d’un membre conservateur de l’élite
économique canadienne à une époque de transformations majeures.  
R.B. Bennett’s new Deal radio broadcasts in January 1935 came as anunpleasant surprise to some listeners. His supporters in the 1930 election
could barely have imagined that Bennett would publicly proclaim the death of
laissez-faire five years later, but that is what he did, albeit in a somewhat con-
trived and cynical way.1 Howard p. Robinson (1874–1950), a Saint John, new
Brunswick, capitalist and newspaper owner, wrote Bennett in early January
1935 to alert him to the siege atmosphere that his speeches were contributing
to within an already beleaguered business community. “personally,” Robinson
explained, “i have felt that we have come a long way towards recovery,” but
“[u]nfortunately, your remarks are being interpreted, or perhaps i should say
misinterpreted, and through propaganda, it is being made to appear that we are
going to have the new Deal, the n.R.A. and all kinds of interference, through
despotic bureaucrats, with a normal trend of business.” Citing the need to fos-
ter the self-reliant “pioneering spirit” of years gone by, Robinson claimed that
“[i]n the Maritime provinces at least, nine men out of ten ... are firm believers
in the efficacy of the British method in dealing with the conditions arising
from the cycle of depression which we have been moving through. We, here,
believe in evolution, not in revolution, and nothing is quite as alarming as what
the man-in-the-street calls ‘a yankee nostrum’.”2 the “British method,”
according to Robinson’s view of the world, was a breakwater guarding against
the troubling currents he observed south of the border. 
Britishness shaped Robinson’s view of the social structure that he had
climbed so successfully; it was, indeed, ubiquitous in his worldview. this
paper examines the ways in which Robinson understood Britishness and the
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of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties (toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1972), 64–8,
tends to place heavier emphasis on the sense of shock the new Deal addresses produced
among Conservatives. 
2 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), R.B. Bennett papers, MG 26 k, vol. 715,
439096–8, Howard p. Robinson to R.B. Bennett, 7 January 1935. 
British tradition during the 1930s and 1940s, thus offering a case study of how
these concepts were understood and articulated by a conservative member of
Canada’s economic élite. examining a specific variant of Britishness during a
period when economic crisis and political change threatened old truisms, this
study engages the “British World” concept, most prominently championed by
phillip Buckner, which has tended to emphasize the unifying impulse of
Britishness and its ability to construct a consensual empire.3 yet, as Buckner
and other scholars have also recognized, Britishness had long been a remark-
ably open-ended concept that was interpreted in a variety of contingent ways,
including a range of liberal, radical, and social-democratic meanings. this was
so when early twentieth century social reformers looked to British precedents,
and the enduring popular relevance of the British connection was dramatically
in view when king George Vi and Queen elizabeth visited Canada on a royal
tour of all nine provinces in 1939; they were greeted by nearly one-third of the
Canadian population, some three million people.4 Moreover, the massive post-
war British migration to Canada — 600,000 people between 1945 and 1957 —
helped shore up and transform the wider British World in Canada, just as pub-
lic intellectuals expressed a renewed appreciation for the British liberal
tradition during World War ii and in the anti-communist political climate of
the early Cold War.5 the case of Howard Robinson throws light upon a dif-
ferent understanding of Britishness, one which assumed racialist thinking,
endorsed ideals of free enterprise and championed imperialist sentiment. As
these were eroded by an approaching social democratic age, disillusionment
set in among its advocates. increasingly, Britishness of this sort became
anachronistic and divisive rather than unifying. Robinson’s experience was an
archetypical instance of broader trends amongst his social peers who sat on the
boards of major business institutions and also grappled with the onset of a new
era. 
Howard p. Robinson was a recognized figure in national business circles.
Detesting publicity and preferring to operate behind the scenes, he often
remained beyond the public’s gaze, and relatively little is known about him
even among specialists in regional or business history. Some contemporary
observers did take notice of him: representatives of the social democratic and
communist left could both agree after World War ii that Robinson was among
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the small élite that dominated Canada’s economic life.6 He was already reach-
ing the twilight of his career by that time; in 1944 Robinson was attempting to
disengage from active involvement in business life and by the following year
he had sold his newspaper and radio interests to k.C. irving.7 though increas-
ingly inactive, Robinson remained a prominent business figure, as in 1945
when the Canadian pacific Railway (CpR) appointed him to its board of direc-
tors — a distinction which made him the first-ever true Maritime resident to
hold a CpR directorship. He also remained active in cultural affairs, continu-
ing to serve on the board of governors of the new Brunswick Museum, to
which he had been appointed in 1929. 
these heights were not foretold by Robinson’s relatively modest social
origins. He was born in the village of elgin, Albert County, new Brunswick,
in 1874. His father Robert D. Robinson farmed, worked as a schoolteacher and
superintendent for Albert County, and became a small manufacturer of birch
spools. the family was deeply rooted in the region: his mother, Lavenia
Robinson, née Stiles, was of pre-Loyalist descent, while Loyalist ancestry
existed on his father’s side. As a child, Robinson moved to the bustling agri-
cultural centre of Sussex, where his father operated a local newspaper, the
King’s County Record. Robinson attended Mount Allison University and later
joined his father’s newspaper and printing business; he helped his father estab-
lish a farming paper, the Maritime Farmer, and Robinson took over and
reorganized the business after his father’s death in 1901.8 He soon moved to
Saint John and became involved in the province’s emergent telephone busi-
ness, orchestrating a merger between the two competing provincial companies
in 1906. Moving into the securities business before World War i, and power
and street railways during the war, Robinson was poised to become one of the
most influential capitalists of the Maritime region in the following decades.9
He bought his first Saint John daily in 1920 and by 1927 controlled the city’s
entire daily press, moving into radio the following decade; he promoted the
ascendance of pulp and paper in the 1920s and became associated with the tri-
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7 new Brunswick Museum (hereafter nBM), John Clarence Webster papers (hereafter JCWp),
S 194, file 230, Robinson to John Clarence Webster, 19 October 1944. 
8 “Business, professional Men Gather to pay Final tribute At Late publisher’s Funeral,” King’s
County Record (Sussex) (31 August 1950), 1; “Howard p. Robinson Dies; Outstanding Business
Leader,” Telegraph-Journal (Saint John) (24 August 1950), 1 and 5; Census of Canada, 1871,
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Section 2, 2; G.p. Burchill, The Story of the New Brunswick Telephone Company: As told to the
Writer by one of its Founders — Mr. Howard P. Robinson (nelson-Miramichi, 1974). 
umvirate of companies that dominated that industry in new Brunswick; he
remained an imposing figure on the board of directors of the new Brunswick
telephone Company; and he accumulated directorships of numerous other
companies, including the Royal Bank of Canada and Famous players of
Canada.10
Robinson’s network of contacts extended to the commanding heights of
business and political life in Canada and beyond. He maintained relatively
close contact with business figures who had left new Brunswick to accumu-
late fortunes abroad, including Lord Beaverbrook and Sir James Dunn; and he
also cultivated friendships with Canadian business titans such as CpR presi-
dent Sir edward Beatty and Morris Wilson, Sir Herbert Holt’s successor as
president of the Royal Bank of Canada. in new Brunswick Robinson was
ever-present — though often unseen. He was one of a group of powerful cap-
italists principally interested in the forestry sector who, in response to the new
Brunswick Liberal government’s promise to aggressively extend public power
development, worked — successfully — to elect J.B.M. Baxter’s
Conservatives in the important 1925 provincial election.11 He was also a lead-
ing supporter of the Maritime Rights movement, indicative of that movement’s
pro-business bias in Saint John.12 the non-partisanship of the Maritime Rights
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movement also reflected the manner in which Robinson operated his newspa-
per, which was generally non-partisan, save for cases such as the 1925
provincial election when the broader interests of private enterprise were per-
ceived to be under threat. Robinson’s ideological tendencies, which linked
intense imperial sentiment with the strictures of self-reliance and private enter-
prise, made him more sympathetic to the Conservative cause, but by no means
was he a reliable party man. 
the political world was becoming much more complicated by 1935.
Months after Bennett’s new Deal addresses, Robinson continued to lament
what he considered to be the prime minister’s “right-angled turn,” which,
Robinson complained, helped to legitimize “any radical proposal which might
be made.” He also worried about the lately rebellious english-born Mp from
Vancouver, H.H. Stevens, whose recent investigation of price spreads had
embarrassed some important toronto retailers.13 though Stevens “was one of
those englishmen who inherited his political principles at the seat of the
empire,” Robinson disapprovingly noted that “he is believed to represent the
Hyde park idea,” London’s famed site of popular protest.14 Robinson, like
many others, did not propose a thoughtless aping of the mother country, for
political dissent was just as repugnant to him at the seat of empire as it was
anywhere else. Like many of his contemporaries, he propounded the idealistic
ambition of creating a “Better Britain” in Canada.15 in fact, Robinson claimed
to feel “more British than many people living in england.”16
Moreover, Robinson felt new Brunswick had already achieved a special
place within the history of the British empire, being, as he believed it was, a
product of the empire’s “greatest romance”: the Loyalist migration.17 the
Loyalists, who founded new Brunswick in 1784 and incorporated the City of
Saint John the following year, had throughout the nineteenth century become
144
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a subject of sustained mythmaking. the Loyalist myth, as described by
Murray Barkley, emphasized the themes of self-sacrifice and divine purpose
and portrayed the Loyalists as hailing from élite social origins.18 Robinson
built upon this myth in a 1932 essay, which was read by new Brunswick
Lieutenant-Governor Hugh H. McLean before a gathering of the new
Brunswick Loyalist Society on Loyalist Day (18 May) in Saint John.19 Setting
out to rehabilitate the Loyalists from what he considered to be unfair treatment
at the hands of American scholars, Robinson argued that leaders on the revo-
lutionary side consisted of a band of smugglers, thieves, and business failures,
including the likes of paul Revere and Samuel Adams. the Loyalists, by con-
trast, were solid, property-owning citizens who were also joined by a racially
diverse group; Robinson claimed “[a]ll classes, creeds and nationalities ...
seem to have come to this province with the Loyalists.” While the crown could
thus work to unite a racially and socially diverse group, Robinson seemed to
believe that this larger group could not count themselves among the Loyalists,
since they had come to the “province with the Loyalists,” not, Robinson
implied, as Loyalists themselves.20 A broader lesson, in Robinson’s view,
could be learned from this homogeneous, property-owning class who sacri-
ficed everything for the idea of empire. “At all times and in all revolutions,”
he asserted, 
it is the man without stake in a community, the floater or irresponsible indi-
vidual, who is the first to demand an appeal to force in settling his difficulties
with his fellow men. the more mature brain of the educated individual and his
natural desire not to jeopardize his stake in the community by resorting to
arms, naturally, puts him in the class of those who favor constitutional meth-
ods of correcting wrongs rather than by restoring to arms. the Loyalists were
of this latter class.21
Robinson thus viewed property ownership as central to responsible citizenship
and political maturity, and the Loyalists were in his view a beacon of both. He
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believed their story should occupy a privileged place within the empire’s his-
tory; “many incidents in the empire’s history have been preserved by historians
and poets,” he waxed, “and the majority of them trivial in comparison with the
exploits of the Loyalists.”22
Believing the Loyalists to be a shining example of good citizenship and
imperial spirit, Robinson sought to promote their history through the new
Brunswick Museum. He was among the early promoters of the idea of a
provincial museum and was a central figure in its eventual realization in
1929.23 His interest in a provincial museum was born out of a concern “for
future generations and for good citizenship reasons”; far from arcane motiva-
tions, Robinson consciously envisioned the museum as a project through
which a civic identity would be constructed in which the Loyalist past would
be central.24 As chairman of the museum’s finance committee he played a cru-
cial role in soliciting money from wealthy friends for a new museum building.
From the beginning, Robinson thought of the new Brunswick Museum as a
sort of shrine to the Loyalists. that being the case, he was sufficiently savvy
to realize that funds were more likely to be obtained from the provincial gov-
ernment if Acadian history was also represented in the museum.25 However,
cost overruns at the University of new Brunswick apparently made premier
Baxter reticent about financing the construction of a museum building with
government money.26 eventually, the City of Saint John came through with
$100,000 while private donations totaled something in the neighborhood of
$70,000. the provincial government also in the end kicked in $75,000 in
Dominion government funds earmarked for relief projects.27
the museum building officially opened on Douglas Avenue on 16 August
1934, as part of a three-day celebration of the 150th anniversary of the found-
ing of new Brunswick. An imposing grey structure with pillars lining the
entrance and the dates “1784” and “1934” embossed on the front façade
above, the museum itself became, as Greg Marquis has observed, “[t]he major
edifice that would mark the 150th anniversary of the Loyalist province.”28
Robinson had advised such a course in March in private correspondence with
fellow new Brunswick Museum board member Dr. John Clarence Webster,
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writing that “if we can organize a celebration of the 150th anniversary of this
province and make the formal opening of the Museum at that time the centre
of our activities, it will do a great deal to introduce it to the public.”29 the fol-
lowing month he urged that steps be taken to “crystallize public opinion on
this very necessary celebration.” He ultimately played an active role in plan-
ning the event.30
After his election as president of the museum in 1948, Robinson reflected
on the broad development of the institution and its collection. He was not
entirely satisfied. Dr. Webster and his wife had played a major role in devel-
oping the museum’s collection. even though Robinson appreciated their
support, he lamented that their activities “seem unfortunately ... to run towards
the perpetuation of the things which our early French settlers did.” He also
questioned the appropriateness of using museum resources to preserve
“bronzes and things which come to us from China.” Arguing that Acadian his-
tory was being looked after in the province at the Beauséjour Museum,
Robinson maintained that the new Brunswick Museum should be left “free to
deal with and perpetuate the history of the United empire Loyalists,” as well
as the “Golden Age of Sail.” these two themes, Robinson believed, were “of
supreme importance to all new Brunswickers” and should form the museum’s
focus.31 the important past was the British past, to Robinson’s mind, as both
themes celebrated Britishness: the moral resolve and courage of the Loyalists
could be celebrated in the first, and British shipbuilding ingenuity and com-
mercial dominance in the second. Robinson had articulated this view to
Webster ten years earlier. “i am unfortunately one of those who do not think
the French period of our history was an important one,” he stated, “except
from the standpoint of human interest. the real start of the Maritime provinces
began when the yorkshiremen and the new englanders came in prior to the
American Revolution; subsequently, the arrival of the Loyalists did the real
trick in establishing this as a white man’s country.”32 Casting the British as a
progressive and dynamic race, a race from which he descended, Robinson
argued that the “genius of British people” went even beyond the formal bound-
aries of empire: “France never had any offshoot like the United States, South
Africa or Canada springing from her loins.”33 Such biological metaphors artic-
ulated the racialist underpinning of Robinson’s sense of Britishness and, by
extension, his own sense of racial superiority; as some of his surviving per-
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sonal papers reveal, he was deeply interested in his own genealogy and had
been active in establishing his own Loyalist ancestry.34
though he viewed the United States as a testament to the ingenuity of the
British race, Robinson was increasingly wary of political and cultural devel-
opments south of the border in the 1930s and was concerned that prime
Minister Bennett was preparing to mimic the new Deal policies of Roosevelt
in 1935. Robinson had been much more comfortable with Bennett’s earlier
sentiment, expressed in Saint John during Loyalist Day celebrations two years
earlier, when the prime minister advised listeners to look to the example of the
Loyalists for inspiration in hard times: “we pray in these days of universal
depression we may cultivate their virtues and emulate their example.”35 the
continuing economic depression and the concomitant political ferment made it
increasingly difficult for politicians to sustain an adherence to orthodox eco-
nomic principles that restrained government intervention, however; and even
Bennett, widely appreciated as a stalwart of rugged individualism within the
national business class, was forced to acknowledge growing calls for a more
active state role in economic and social life.36 Robinson perceived these devel-
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6, Robinson to Milner, 23 September 1930, and 27 February 1933. their personal relationship
appears to have deteriorated as well, and Milner accused Robinson of trying to take over the
project. See, especially, ibid., file 7, Milner to Robinson, 11 February 1935, and 12 February
1938. Robinson, as his penciled remarks on a copy of the manuscript read, considered the text
to be “so full of careless errors in copying and arranging as to require complete re-writing”; but,
“Mr. Milner was very old + re-writing was out of the question.” See nBM, R&Hp, file 10,
“History of Albert County,” n.d. the conflict between the two men was, it seems, also the prod-
uct of differing political outlooks. And, Milner, who was nearly 90 years old at the time, could
be equally critical of Robinson’s work; the Telegraph-Journal, Milner wrote Robinson, “is
regarded as a hack to serve you and your interests in public utilities and is useless as a public
servant.” See nBM, WCMp, file 6, Milner to Robinson, 11 February 1935. 
35 Marquis, “Commemorating the Loyalists in the Loyalist City,” 30; “Bennett praises Loyalist
Spirit,” Telegraph-Journal (19 May 1933), 11. 
36 Larry A. Glassford, Reaction and Reform: The Politics of the Conservative Party under R.B.
Bennett, 1927–1938 (toronto: University of toronto press, 1992), 87–8. 
opments not merely as challenges to the specific economic order, but also to
the British World itself, both being directly linked in his mental universe. 
His continued invocation of things British needs also to be understood in
relation to developments on the left. Since the end of World War i, as ian
Mckay has observed, the major left formation, centred around the Communist
party of Canada, was decidedly internationalist in outlook, just as public intel-
lectuals of the 1930s, including A.R.M. Lower and figures associated with the
League for Social Reconstruction, such as Frank H. Underhill and F.R. Scott,
looked upon the imperial connection with attitudes ranging from indifference
to outright hostility.37 it was no accident that Robinson developed a particular
animus towards university professors during the decade.38 Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) leader J.S. Woodsworth was, meanwhile,
“an idealistic internationalist” and pacifist, who in September 1939 went so far
as to oppose Canada’s involvement in another european war alongside
Britain.39 these observations require some qualification, however. thinkers
on the left often opposed British imperialism without opposing Britishness as
such and, as James naylor has demonstrated, Britishness, including calls for
“British Justice,” persisted in left and labour circles throughout the 1930s —
although even this sense of Britishness was “often overtly dismissed in favour
of a broader internationalism.”40 though British identity remained ubiquitous,
the Canadian left was at the very least becoming more nuanced — and
ambiguous — in its embrace of Britishness. Robinson had little patience for
such views and continued to see imperialism and unfettered capitalism as cen-
tral to the British tradition. According to this outlook, the left was
categorically opposed to all that was good in the British tradition. And, indeed,
as the American-born union movement, the Committee for industrial
Organization (CiO), came to represent the greatest threat to employers at the
workplace during the last half of the 1930s, others like Robinson unfurled the
Union Jack in defiance.41
149
37 ian Mckay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada’s Left History (toronto: Between the
Lines, 2005), 155–69; Francis, “Historical perspectives on Britain,” 309–21; Michiel Horn,
The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada,
1930–1942 (toronto: University of toronto press, 1980), 11–12. 
38 For example, see nBp, JCWp, file 228, Robinson to Webster, 8 January 1938. 
39 Allen Mills, Fool for Christ: The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth (toronto: University
of toronto press, 1991), 210. 
40 James naylor, “Canadian Labour politics and the British Model, 1920–1950,” in Canada and
the British World, 288–308. 
41 the decisive confrontation with the CiO occurred at General Motors of Canada’s operations
in Oshawa in 1937. See irving Abella, “Oshawa 1937,” in On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles
in Canada, 1919–1949, ed., irving Abella (toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1974), 93–128;
and John t. Saywell, ‘Just call me Mitch’: The Life of Mitchell F. Hepburn (toronto:
University of toronto, 1991), 303–33. Opponents of the CiO often claimed the union and its 
HOWARD ROBinSOn AnD tHe “BRitiSH MetHOD”: A CASe StUDy 
OF BRitiSHneSS in CAnADA DURinG tHe 1930S AnD 1940S
Such efforts to appropriate the British tradition were highly contested,
however. Supporters and representatives of the CiO commonly viewed their
struggle in terms of the fulfillment of a different British tradition. United
Automobile Workers president Homer Martin, fresh from the CiO’s epic bat-
tle with General Motors in Flint, addressed striking autoworkers in Oshawa in
1937 during their important battle with General Motors of Canada, and, aware
of the cultural framework of his listeners, placed their struggle within a longer
history of social progress within the British empire, arguing that Ontario’s
hysterically anti-CiO Liberal premier, Mitch Hepburn, “seeks to turn back the
clock of the history of the British empire.”42 And, earl Rowe, leader of the
Ontario Conservatives, argued that Hepburn’s hard-line and provocative
stance ran counter to British “ideas and institutions.”43 Moreover, reform-
minded élite figures, such as Vincent Massey, viewed social reform as entirely
compatible with an evolving British tradition. As a Liberal party organizer
before his appointment as high commissioner for Canada in Britain in 1935,
Massey unsuccessfully attempted to initiate a leftward swing within the
Liberal party, pressing for the adoption of “new Liberalism” and embracing
the ideas of British economist John Maynard keynes.44 Massey, on the other
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and 47. 
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hand, considered some of those who expressed conservative ideas about the
British empire as “living intellectually in a pre-war era.”45
Robinson’s ideology was residual, indeed, born of a time that was pass-
ing; and the British tradition was certainly broader and more amorphous than
he recognized. He perceived contemporary political developments as a chal-
lenge to the propertied foundations of society and hoped for a reinvigorated
imperial sentiment to shore up the old order. “i am rapidly coming to the point
where i fear i am going to be one of those who believe that the only way of
saving the British empire is for the individual Britisher to get rough and rude
and crude again and fight for his own peroperty [sic] as well as for his neigh-
bour’s,” wrote Robinson in December 1938, explicitly aligning the empire’s
defence with the protection of private property.46 Less than a year into World
War ii, he wondered whether the empire had become “over-civilized”; “the
stuff that made the British empire seems to have been civilized out of us,” he
lamented. “the British have been slapped, kicked and insulted by practically
every nation in the world and it is about time that somebody showed a little bit
of the good old British stuff that did not take this sort of back-talk from any-
body”; “our only hope is to become rough, tough and dusty,” concluded
Robinson.47 this prescription for a return to primal tactics was directed at both
internal and external threats. Only months into the war, Robinson anticipated
a resumption of battles on the domestic front after the war’s end. the enemies
were many: 
i see indications in Canada of a quite active Communistic propaganda cam-
paign being carried out by publishers of books; idealistic editors and
newspaper contributors; college professors; uplifters working through institu-
tions presumably patterned after english bodies of similar name and objects;
clergymen, in most cases of the United Church, with an occasional Baptist;
radio commentators, largely from the United States stations, and people of this
ilk. When the war, either on land or sea, terminates, the front is going to be
nearer home and i am one of those who favor getting organized to combat
these spreaders of disruption at that time, because i anticipate that a lot of
them will be released from the penalties of a restrictive character imposed by
the war.48
Lacking nuance in his view of political options to his left, Robinson applied
the “communist” label freely in promoting the battle against adversaries of the
social order as he understood it. 
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He thus also embraced a very restrictive view of the realm of legitimate
debate within the public sphere. Robinson was not alone in this, for economic
crisis and the spread of radicalism during the 1930s had caused some ambiva-
lence within Canada’s big bourgeoisie towards democratic principles. William
Lyon Mackenzie king spoke with a touch of hyperbole when he claimed the
“national government” drive conducted behind the scenes during the 1935 fed-
eral election threatened “democracy,” but he was no doubt correct in believing
that its backers, the most vocal of whom was CpR president Sir edward
Beatty, wanted a coalition between the two major parties in order to push
through legislation that — because of its unpopularity — no party by itself
would dare propose.49 Many national government supporters hoped, most
specifically, for an amalgamation of the government-owned Canadian
national Railways (CnR) with the CpR, arguing that such a course, though
unpopular, was necessary to maintain the nation’s credit.50 Robinson, a friend
of Beatty, was undoubtedly sympathetic in sentiment, if not an active sup-
porter of this drive. Before the outbreak of World War ii, Robinson expressed
opinions that revealed considerable equanimity towards the apparent decline
of democracy. in 1938 he expressed the view that “we are entering a period
when dictatorships, even though temporary in character, are bound to make
tremendous headway, due to their temporary efficiency in competition with
the stumbling and blundering methods of our democracy.” though he believed
democracy would win in the end, Robinson still saw the possibility of having
“to go back to the Dark Ages and gradually creep back again to the Golden
Age of Democracy.”51
Robinson’s important political ally from the 1925 provincial election,
Supreme Court of new Brunswick Judge and former new Brunswick
Conservative premier J.B.M. Baxter, expressed opinions on world affairs of a
more concrete nature that same year: “i wish england were clear of any diplo-
macy which may yet make her an ally of Soviet Russia and i hope Franco wins
in Spain. i would rather have dictators from the better classes than submit to
the dictatorship of those — or in the end — perhaps one, whose outlook is that
of the criminal classes.” As Britain sustained military defeats against the
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of democracy in newfoundland during the 1930s. See James Overton, “economic Crisis and
the end of Democracy: politics in newfoundland during the Great Depression,” Labour/Le
Travail 26 (Fall 1990): 85–124. From an empire perspective, the national government cam-
paign gained strength from the fact that a national government had been formed in Britain
under Ramsay MacDonald in 1931. 
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Germans in 1940, Baxter turned his vitriol towards “the Ramsay MacDonalds’
of Great Britain and the J.S. Woodsworths’ of Canada and the deference which
all Liberal Governments pay to the people of this stripe,” whom he blamed for
the empire’s vulnerability.52 Baxter’s political and cultural sensibilities —
combining a reverence for Loyalism and social order with a dogmatic com-
mitment to private enterprise — were similar to those of Robinson. And, in
early 1939 C. George McCullagh, mining magnate and president and publisher
of the Globe and Mail, established the short-lived Leadership League, an orga-
nization designed to rid political life of partisanship and decrease the size and
presumed waste of government. the league was premised upon the notion that
democracy required stronger leadership than was being provided by the main
political parties, and the organization had some obvious authoritarian under-
tones.53 As economic crisis and radicalism spread, Robinson and other
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upper-class Canadians on the political right adopted political tactics and
beliefs that indicated a growing aloofness from democratic principles. Once
World War ii began and the empire was thus engaged in a war against fascism,
however, the political context changed dramatically, and Robinson’s letters
ceased to overtly question the efficacy of democratic government. His focus
shifted to winning the war, which came to mean specifically the defence of
Britain against the threat of invasion. 
With the war approaching, as a director of the Canadian press (Cp),
Robinson expressed concern over the Cp’s dependence upon American
sources for empire news, namely its dependence upon the Associated press
(Ap). He had, indeed, been working to strengthen the Cp’s connection with
London for the past ten years, lamenting the funneling of empire news through
American sources as “an inter-empire tragedy.” this was a tragedy, to
Robinson’s mind, because Ap news worked to undermine imperial sentiment
in Canada. “i am convinced that this ... news,” Robinson thundered, “together
with the agitations of college professors and university organizations, has had
a great deal to do with undermining of loyalty to the empire which now
undoubtedly exists in many parts of Canada.”54 Robinson encouraged Lord
Beaverbrook to sponsor an empire news service, but Beaverbrook was uncon-
vinced. He told Robinson that he did not believe in propaganda during
peacetime and that his own daily newspaper, the London Daily Mirror, itself
subscribed to the Ap news service.55 With the onset of war with Germany in
September, the need for effective propaganda became more pressing. the dis-
semination of empire news was, believed Robinson, an important aspect of the
propaganda campaign. He lamented the fact that Canadian newspapers were
free to pick up news from news services of their choice and supported a Cp
proposal to the British Ministry of information “that the British Government
... subsidize the cabling to Canada and the United States of important official
statements and texts.”56 He was also critical of the radio broadcasts, which
were delivered in a “super Oxford accent” and replete with idioms specific to
england, that the British government was sending to north America; though
these broadcasts were fine for Canada, they were a source of derision in the
United States. He expressed dissatisfaction with the responses he received on
all these fronts, though he pressed ahead, disseminating pamphlets passed to
him by Beaverbrook and in the second half of 1940 arranging a trip to Canada
for 45 leading American newspapermen in order to build support for the
British war effort.57 At the end of the war Robinson complained that Canada
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56 ibid., 6 May 1940. 
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had received 90 percent of its war news from American sources, and he con-
tinued to press for a direct liaison between London and the Cp.58
in retrospect, this was an impossible battle because the underpinnings of
the British World Robinson cherished were being eroded by the rising tides of
continental integration and social democracy. Arthur Meighen’s brief and
unsuccessful resurrection as leader of the Conservative party in 1942 indicated
that ultra-imperialist politics had become less effective since World War i.
Meighen, who had in recent years stamped himself as a strident defender of
private enterprise in his public pronouncements on the railway question, lost
to the CCF candidate in the york South by-election in the spring; largely
Anglo-Saxon and working class, the residents of york South were not swayed
by Meighen’s ultra-imperialist “win-the-war” campaign, which promised little
else than conscription and “national government.” Meighen was particularly
stung by the defeat because it was in an Anglo-Saxon riding.59 As Michiel
Horn has noted, “the issue of imperial loyalty was losing its power to dis-
tract.”60
Robinson responded to this development by championing the elevation of
Manitoba premier John Bracken to the leadership of the Conservative party at
the party convention later in the year, where the party was re-branded as the
progressive Conservative party upon Bracken’s insistence. Robinson viewed
the leftward shift of the party, or at least the appearance of such, as a necessity
in order to combat the CCF after the war. He based this view upon the assump-
tion that the Liberal party would inevitably fall from power once the war
ended, as had the Conservatives after the previous war.61 Months earlier, a
group including Robinson and George McCullagh, as well as Arthur Meighen,
believed that Bracken could possibly head a revitalized national government
campaign, and though this idea fell apart quickly, Bracken’s financial backers,
which included the CpR, expected to wield considerable clout.62 Robinson’s
efforts appear to have been purely tactical — and did not signal a substantive
ideological shift; as he recognized in 1938, “we must realize today that we are
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living in an age of realizm [sic] when ideas and ideals have got to be kept in
cold storage until such a time as a change in public thinking and public senti-
ment again brings us back to an era of fair-play and encouragement for private
enterprise. Until that time arrives i feel that it is wise to more or less compro-
mise with the assassins.”63 Regardless, his machinations went for naught,
because the Liberal party would stay in power until 1957, seven years after
Robinson’s death. 
Robinson never reconciled himself to the form of hegemony that was
being negotiated in the 1940s, in which the Liberal party played a particularly
important role. Whereas Mackenzie king and the Liberals built electoral
strength by accommodating public opinion in Québec, Robinson’s unbending
imperial and racialist sentiments made it impossible for him to endorse or even
consider such a strategy. One of the most significant challenges to the mainte-
nance of the imperial connection in Canada was, according to Robinson in
1942, that “[o]ne-third of our population by blood, religion, sentiment and
nationalistic ambitions, being located in or directly through Quebec, are either
solidly anti-British or neutral.” He also cited the recently revealed fact that 52
percent of Canada’s total population was non-British as one of several funda-
mental challenges to the persistence of empire in Canada.64 On the heels of the
war, Robinson was troubled by the early shift towards a multicultural civic
identity, complaining to Lord Beaverbrook in October 1945 about “a definite
trend, which we get evidence of now in the demands for a Canadian flag, the
recognition of Canadian ‘nationality’ and the obvious attempt to substitute a
dirge called ‘Oh [sic] Canada’ for ‘the king.’”65 the bitterness conveyed here
bespeaks Robinson’s sense of marginalization and helplessness following the
war. 
though the war was won, the British World he cherished was falling
apart. Having supported Beaverbrook’s empire Free trade campaign in the
1930s, Robinson lamented indications of economic divergence between
Britain and Canada following the war.66 He had played a somewhat complicit
role in producing such an outcome, however, something he never seemed to
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acknowledge on a conscious level. Robinson had never been reticent about
attracting American capital to Canada, and he had opposed the proposed pulp-
wood embargo in the 1920s, assuming an attitude that seemed to encourage
economic integration with the United States.67 even more striking, Robinson
sat on the board of directors of Famous players of Canada, the Canadian sub-
sidiary of paramount pictures, serving as both representative and critic of
American-imported culture.68 He was aware that Hollywood represented a
challenge to the essentially British culture he sought to preserve in Canada, but
he was resigned to the view that no definite solution existed.69 that Robinson
was resigned in this belief speaks to his ideological horizon, which did not
encompass the possibility of substantive government intervention. in the post-
war period it was essentially a cultural élite, not a business élite, that sought to
draw upon the resources of the state in order to preserve British culture in
Canada as a highbrow fortress against the mass culture of the United States.
even Bennett had been more flexible than Robinson in considering potential
uses of the state in protecting the country from the dominance of American
mass culture, most notably in the establishment of the Canadian Radio
Broadcasting Commission in 1932; and Bennett had even encouraged state-
ownership in the field of airlines during the House of Commons debates on the
formation of trans-Canada Air Lines in 1937.70 though Robinson believed
economic liberalism to be intrinsic to the British empire, on the north
American continent actually existing economic liberalism tended to draw
Canada closer to the United States, especially in a postwar environment where
the United States was the unquestioned economic leader of the capitalist
world. this contradiction apparently failed to register with Robinson, as his
worldview appeared less and less capable of offering a relevant explanation of
contemporary society. He turned inwards to an anti-modern past. in the 1940s
Robinson became interested in the work of new Brunswick folklorist Louise
Manny, who toured the new Brunswick countryside collecting ballads — with
encouragement and a recording device from Lord Beaverbrook. With Manny’s
help in 1947, Robinson published a small collection of poems written by
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Miramichi journalist-poet Hedley parker (1856–1935).71 Most of the ballads
were set in a nineteenth-century past of hardy lumbermen in the new
Brunswick forests.72
As the economic and cultural ties of empire seemed to buckle after the
war, Robinson grew concerned about developments in Britain as well, espe-
cially Churchill’s decisive defeat by the Labour party in 1945 and Britain’s
decision to leave india. Robinson’s re-imagined nineteenth-century new
Brunswick was undoubtedly beginning to appear more British to him than pre-
sent-day Britain. He wondered whether many Canadians embraced more
intense imperial sentiments than those actually charged with the responsibility
of administering the British empire.73 Only by reasoning that recent develop-
ments were “the product of a socialized democracy and not the real feeling of
the people of england” could one sustain a sense of kinship with the “Mother
Country,” lamented Robinson in 1949.74 it was categorical: so-called “social-
ized democracy” existed in opposition to the “real feeling of the people of
england.” in an increasingly incomprehensible world Robinson was steadied
only by his “unbounded faith in British character.”75 His world — the British
World of Arthur Meighen, George McCullagh, and Sir edward Beatty — was
in deep crisis. 
this crisis was, for Robinson, linked fundamentally to the expansion of
the Canadian state into various facets of the nation’s economic and social life.
Voicing his disapproval of the idea of a managed economy, Robinson referred
with derision to the “god-like individuals at Ottawa who are forcing the value
of money down”; “by the accident of political or personal preference,” he
argued, these people have “become our temporary hitlers.”76 He characterized
autocracy and bureaucracy as “first cousins to each other,” expressing the clas-
sical liberal belief that government intervention constituted interference with
individual freedom.77 not only was this a departure from the “British
method,” but the “old virtues” had been discarded and the primacy of
Britishers ceded. Robinson explained: “we are living in an age when all polit-
ical values, public or private morals, all the old virtues are thrown into the
discard and we accept the theory that minorities, decadent races or races not
sufficiently schooled in the ethics of civilization should be the masters of those
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72 Hedley parker, Miramichi Poet: Six Poems By Hedley Parker, ed., Louise Manny and intro.
Lord Beaverbrook (Saint John: new Brunswick Museum, c1947). 
73 HLRO, LBp, Robinson to Beaverbrook, 28 May 1946. 
74 UnBA, LBp, R/file 1 (d), box 51 (a), 314666, Robinson to Beaverbrook, 20 December 1949. 
75 HLRO, LBp, Robinson to Beaverbrook, 2 December 1945. 
76 nBM, JCWp, Robinson to Webster, 18 February 1946. 
77 ibid., 29 March 1945. 
whose background has come through the fiery furnace of experience.”78 thus
Robinson expressed his protest against the new age and the waning influence
of racialist theories. 
Scholars using the British World concept have tended to locate the British
empire’s last gasp in Canada somewhere in the 1950s and 1960s.79 And,
indeed, José igartua has argued that english Canada experienced its own Quiet
Revolution during the 1960s, when english Canadians went through an abrupt
“de-ethnicization,” moving towards national identities that were not specifi-
cally British or tied to the country’s imperial past.80 the residual culture of
empire did not disappear overnight in Canada and, indeed, a Britishness
emphasizing individual rights, the rule of law, and democracy was revitalized
in the postwar period under the rubric of the Commonwealth.81 the right-wing
variant of Britishness that Robinson embraced, however, was more a part of
the past than the future. Robinson’s mentalité had emerged from the assump-
tions of the national policy period, when British capital played a central role
fueling enterprise in Canada, which was directed by businessmen who bene-
fited from government aid but did not submit to government control.82 For
scholars of the British World, this case study throws light upon the political
and ideological uses of Britishness and the archetypal experience of a
Canadian capitalist facing the new realities of the 1930s and 1940s. the anxi-
eties of Robinson and other capitalists like him can be understood within the
context of what ian Mckay has described as the liberal order’s “second period
of organic crisis” in Canada, when the resolution of major societal questions
of the era still remained uncertain.83 As the old economic order crumbled,
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Robinson’s understanding of Britishness was rendered increasingly uncon-
vincing. As such it was coming to occupy its place as a shibboleth of the right
and provided a weak basis for the reconstitution of class power in a social
democratic era. 
* * *
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